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Abstract
In 2018, a peer-reviewed article was published under the name of Richard
Baldwin in which the author presented a critique of fat exclusion and
advocated “fat bodybuilding” as a sport. Some months later, it became
apparent that the article was intended as a hoax written to raise awareness
to, or “expose”, a certain ideology promoted by some academics. As a result,
the editors retracted the article. Using the principles of methodological
behaviorism, and other hoax or hoax-like articles, I will argue that the
thoughts and opinions held by any author are not important to the argument
they present. I will also argue that this form of reflexive ethnography is too
problematic to serve as a method of enquiry. I will therefore conclude that
the Baldwin article should be reinstated.
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In 1996, Sokal published an article in the journal Social Text that was mostly,
and deliberately, comprised of nonsense. The hoax was intended to expose
what the author considered to be a lack of rigor and ideological biases within
the field of postmodern cultural studies. The resulting affair was successful in
that it focused attention on some of the ideas being advocated within the
discipline. In what can be seen as a variant and continuation of the Sokal
paradigm, James Lindsay, Peter Boghossian, and Helen Pluckrose published
four hoax papers in 2017 and 2018 also with the aim of exposing some of the
ideas in critical theory. One of these appeared in the journal Fat Studies,
being published under the name of Richard Baldwin. In the words of Lind-
say, Boghossian, and Pluckrose (2018), the article argued, “That it is only
oppressive cultural norms which make society regard the building of muscle
rather than fat admirable and that bodybuilding and activism on behalf of the
fat could be benefited by including fat bodies displayed in non-competitive
ways.” The article thus suggested that “fat bodybuilding” should become a
part of fat activism. When later explaining the real motivation of the article,
Lindsay et al. stated that they aimed “To see if journals will accept arguments
which are ludicrous and positively dangerous to health if they support cul-
tural constructivist arguments around body positivity and fatphobia.”
While we all should welcome practices that enable us as academics to
reflect on our disciplines, in the current article, I will present a critique of the
so-called grievance studies hoax. I will focus on the Baldwin article to argue,
or perhaps more accurately present a reminder, that the notion of something
being “ludicrous” is too subjective to be really meaningful. The central
aspect of my critique however will be the argument that any thoughts, inten-
tions, or beliefs that an author might have about their own work are not
relevant to any ideas or theory they present. Thus, the fact that Lindsay
et al. intended the Baldwin article to be a hoax is not important as to whether
fat bodybuilding should be considered a legitimate endeavor. The “hoax” (or
perhaps genuine) work of Cole and Wilkins (2013), McDowell (1994), and
Ramachandran (1997) is provided as evidence for this view. After making
some general observations on the hoax methodology, what Lindsay et al.
referred to as “reflexive ethnography,” and other papers in the grievance
studies series, I will recommend that the Baldwin article be reinstated.
The Baldwin article
As a cognitive neuroscientist whose expertise is in brain function (i.e., the
human visual system) and uses vastly different methods (e.g., functional near-
infrared spectroscopy) to those employed in the humanities, I only recently
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became aware of fat studies. A student informed me that the use of the word
“fat,” to describe a certain body type, was returning because “overweight”
was not a description of a person but a judgment. I was somewhat skeptical
because unlike many other modern terms that are intended to be neutral, the
word fat has many negative connotations not apparent in other possible
descriptors that could be used, for instance, “large.” I then became aware of
the grievance studies hoax because of the publicity generated, read the
Baldwin article, and saw that it addressed the issue raised by my student.
The important point here is that after reading the paper, I am now in
agreement with many of the arguments this field puts forward. Further-
more, I now inform others and can even add to the discourse. For instance,
although not a novel point, from an experimental science perspective, fat
people and bodybuilders form two almost perfect experimental (and con-
trol) groups. Both are nontypical in that they occur at the tail end of the
normal distribution of size and both in the same way, that is, they are large.
It is this, of course, that makes the vastly different societal views of each
group particularly interesting.
One of the most striking aspects of the Baldwin article is that there is
nothing particularly ludicrous about large parts of it. This is partly because
most of it presents factual material in the form of background literature and
references to societal discourse surrounding body shape. It’s perhaps easy to
argue that the typical critical theorist is bound not to see anything particularly
ludicrous in the idea that fat bodybuilding should exist. Indeed, this was the
point of the hoax: the idea that the field will publish anything that conforms
to a certain ideological worldview. However, as stated, the present author is
not a critical theorist.
Excepting the general advocacy of fat bodybuilding, the first obvious
hoax point is not until almost halfway through the article when the authors
state that “The prevailing notion that the bodybuilder’s body has been built
whereas the fat body has not is one that requires consideration.” (p. 5).
Although it is very much in the context of the paper’s argument, this state-
ment is unlikely to be correct. By definition, the bodybuilder’s body has been
built and by very hard work. In contrast, there will be very few individuals
who consciously decided that they would prefer to be fat and worked hard to
undertake measures to make it happen, although there may of course be some
people who decided to be fat. Apart from a couple of sentences concerning
“thin privilege” and the author being a professional bodybuilder, which no
reader could know about, its’ then eight paragraphs later before the next
obvious hoax point is made: Fat bodybuilding is “already a sport.” But here
a problem arises for the hoax. The authors present a definition and criteria of
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a sport, the result of which is that fat bodybuilding falls within the criteria. Of
course, this is the very point that Lindsay et al. are making, that is, the
ludicrous notion of fat bodybuilding already being a sport. However, it is
inevitable that if one choses an extremely broad definition of sport, as the
authors did (in which “athletes seek personal meaning”), it will be no surprise
that fat bodybuilding will be incorporated. The same could be said about, for
instance, the sport of walking on one’s hands for 30 minutes each day while
singing Beatles songs.
Aside from these individual points, the central aspect of the Baldwin hoax
concerns the advocacy of being fat. As noted, Lindsay et al. stated in their
explanation of the hoax that they were interested to see whether a journal will
accept ludicrous and dangerous arguments if they conform to an ideology. Of
course, being very fat is dangerous, but if a person wants to be a fat body-
builder and perhaps be part of a like-minded community, then it is up to
them. There are of course related issues such as certain societies having to
pay for the resultant health care costs, but aside from these, it simply comes
down to a matter of opinion as to whether fat bodybuilding is ludicrous.
If the Baldwin article had truly been ludicrous, it would not have received
favorable reviews. To have made it a “real hoax” would have been, for
instance, to have written about “blue-car-ing.” For instance
Although not particularly well reported, drivers of blue cars have found them-
selves increasingly subject to verbal and sometimes physical abuse. This is
often said to be the result of “red car privilege” and neoliberal hegemony. It has
led to some blue car owners attempting to reclaim the term “bluey” and are
currently organising the “blue-car Olympics” in which owners will compete in
track and field events. In the present article . . . . etc . . . etc.
The paradox is this: If a phenomenon is genuine, such as the moral judg-
ment of the fat body, then it is likely to be the subject of critical theory and
published papers. If, by contrast, the phenomenon is truly ludicrous, such as
“blue-car-ing,” it is unlikely to survive the peer-review process, even by the
critical theorists. Importantly, it will definitely not survive as a cultural idea.
Indeed, this began to happen with another paper in the grievance studies
series of articles when a website, critical of some postmodern theorizing,
drew attention to the article. As is sometimes said, the peer-review process
begins once an article has been published.
The central point here is that the Baldwin article was able to be published
because it is perfectly feasible that fat people would like the fat body to be
normalized even if in a way that is extremely bizarre to most people. The fact
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that it is dangerous is irrelevant; smoking was acceptable, normalized, even
cool, until very recently. Furthermore, it is the authors’ own definition of a
hoax article that enabled them to claim they actually wrote one: “By hoaxes,
we meant papers featuring at least one of the following: clearly ludicrous
and/or outrageous theses, visibly amateurish construction, a transparent lack
of rigor, and that clearly demonstrate little understanding of the field” (Lind-
say et al. 2018). Most articles I read and review have at least one of these!
Usually lack of rigor. Lindsay et al. simply set a very low threshold for what
they consider a hoax to be. This enabled them to claim that they actually
wrote a hoax paper.
Of course, this definition of a hoax paper, in particular the outrageous
theses, simply means an idea that departs from currently accepted orthodoxy.
This would preclude many seminal ideas from being published including the
work of Darwin and Copernicus. If the reader is somewhat averse to those
two examples because both were ultimately proved to be true, we can take
Bem (2011), perhaps the most ludicrous paper ever published in a main-
stream peer-reviewed journal. Unlike the subjectivity of the Baldwin thesis,
the ludicrous nature of the Bem work is based on empirical evidence; no
cognitive scientist has ever managed to show that humans can look into the
future, and there is no known mechanism by which it could happen. Although
Bem argued for precognition based on his own empirical data, these data do
not concur with virtually all previous work. Does this therefore make the
Bem paper a hoax? He could have argued (and could still) that it was indeed a
hoax. He could now claim that the paper was intended to show precisely what
it is now used for; a good example of why “psychologists must change the
way they analyse their data” (Wagenmakers et al. 2011:426). That is, a hoax
aimed at exposing the problems of data analysis inherent in the vast majority
of research that employs Fisher-based models of analysis. Notice that the
only difference in these two alternative accounts (i.e., an honest attempt to
show precognition on the one hand and exposing limitations in data analysis
on the other) is what was inside Bem’s head when he designed the experi-
ments. The issue of author motivation, intention, and thought is central to the
present critique and is where I now turn.
Methodological Behaviorism
In 1965, the philosopher Carl Hempel raised the difficulty of asking the
question of what the heart is for. What we do know is that it pumps blood.
The problem is that it does many other things such as make a noise. Subse-
quently, many philosophers, and sometimes behavioral scientists, make the
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distinction between what something is for, that is, its function, as opposed to
what it does. What something does is relatively easy to determine; it is
simply a question of measurement. But what is any object for? This is solely
a question of opinion, preference, or need. Even when something has a
designer with an intention, the issue remains. Thus, the original designer
of the hammer had a clear function in mind. However, your hammer may
be for securing nails into a wall whereas mine is for preventing paper from
blowing away.
This issue occurs in a vast number of everyday situations and can create
much debate and argument. One of the criticisms of many elected officials is
that they are a “career politician.” The direct assumption here is that an
individual became a politician for some personal gain. That was its function
and what it is for. It may well be for some, or indeed not. This however is
very different to what the person does as a politician, the important thing.
One can even imagine the following scenario in which there are two politi-
cians. One is only “in it for themselves.” Their intention (or function) is
solely to make lots of money, be famous, and maybe even have an easy life
of doing little. The other by contrast is extremely altruistic and is motivated
by the desire to improve everyday lives. The former turns out to be a brilliant
and popular figure who achieves a great deal politically, particularly, let us
say, for those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. The latter, dili-
gently working away, is opposite and achieves little for anyone. Who would
people rather see returned in an upcoming election? It has to be the former,
who does not care about anyone but themselves. The critical point is that it is
irrelevant what this politician privately thinks; it is only their behavior output
that is of importance. Of course, their intentions will determine what they do,
but again, it is only their behavior that matters and should be judged, not what
they thought before they acted. It is simply irrelevant what a person privately
thinks and what motivates them. A further example concerns the notion that
the European Union is trying to “punish” the UK for voting to leave the
union. Behaviorally (i.e., their negotiating stance), punishing the UK will
look no different than if the European Union had a different intention or
thought, that is, to dissuade others from leaving. One does not have to be a
relativist in a humanities department to acknowledge that intentions are
purely relative and furthermore not important when judging an outcome.1
The notion that thoughts and intentions are unimportant to how the world
works has been around for a long time and continues in academia today. For
example, it is central to the critique of Darwin’s theory of evolution put
forward by Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) and is the very basis of the
famous Turing test. The most explicit expression of this notion, with respect
6 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
to psychological theory, comes in the form of methodological behaviorism.
In the first half of the twentieth century, before the cognitivist revolution, the
behaviorist school of thought dominated psychology. Its basic tenets were
that human behavior is best explained by a form of learning theory in which a
stimulus is encountered, registered by various physiological systems, and
results in a reflective response. Not only was this a theoretical view on why
humans and animals do what they do but it also, and necessarily, advocated a
certain method of empirical research. Specifically, an organism (typically a
rat or pigeon) is presented with a stimulus, and the experimenter measures
the resultant behavior. Importantly, the motivations, feelings, and what the
organism may think are not relevant to its behavior and should not therefore
be under consideration.
These principles can also be applied to any academic paper including the
Baldwin article. As noted above, there is just too much in the Baldwin article
that makes it a “real” nonhoax article. It is rather like an academic
paper Turing test. By generating an article that is no different to every other
paper published in the fat studies field, Lindsay et al. have effectively con-
tributed to the very literature they aimed to undermine. Its ludicrousness is in
the eye of the beholder. Even Postmodern Generator occasionally produces
conceptually meaningful sentences. In their explanation of the hoax, and the
other hoax papers in the grievance studies series, the authors do explicitly
make the point that the papers were written to fit with the intended literature.
Lindsay et al. state that they intentionally made the papers “blend in almost
perfectly with others in the discipline” to “fully participate in their culture.”
Indeed, the Baldwin article does just that. In other words, if it acts like a
critical theory paper and quacks like a critical theory paper, it is a critical
theory paper.
The single most revealing aspect of their explanation however is when
Lindsay et al. stated that “The biggest difference between us and the scholar-
ship we are studying by emulation is that we know we made things up”
(italics added). This is the very crux of the issue; the paper is a “hoax” solely
on the basis of what the authors privately thought; what they knew. As with
intentions, brilliant but career politicians, andmethodological behaviorism, it
is simply unimportant what the authors thought when writing the article. That
is, what the article is “for” as opposed to what the article does. The article, as
with any paper, simply presents a number of ideas. It is only these that can be
evaluated for merit not private thoughts.
It is not uncommon for an academic to propose ideas that they do not
believe in. Many fields of enquiry are both empirical and theoretical (e.g.,
cognitive science and evolutionary biology). Experimenters within these
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disciplines are expected to generate ideas and theories to explain what they
have observed; it is deemed insufficient to simply report that a particular
phenomenon occurs. Often however, it is very difficult to know why an effect
happens and authors will generate theories, often reported near the end of an
article in which they are sometimes said to be “hand-waving,” that is, gen-
erating possible explanations and thus theory. The result is that authors often
present ideas that they do not believe. In effect, they make thing up. As
above, the important point is that it does not matter what an author privately
thinks; a theory is suggested which can then be tested in future experiments.
The hypothetico-deductive model of theory generation and hypothesis test-
ing is agnostic as to what one thinks.
The fact that author intentions are not relevant can also be seen in the
following thought experiment concerning what could have been an outcome
of presenting the “ludicrous” fat bodybuilding notion. Imagine the following
letter is sent and somehow received by Lindsay or one of his co-hoaxers.
Dear Professor Baldwin. I just wanted to thank you for your work on fat
bodybuilding. I am a fat person who has suffered dreadful abuse throughout
my life. I think your work is important because fat studies has become tarn-
ished with some of the ludicrous nonsense that is coming out of some univer-
sity departments. What is now needed is other university work that presents the
reasonable face of large body research. As well as thanking you, I am writing to
ask if you would consider giving a 30-minute talk at the annual gathering of the
Fat Society in downtown Los Angeles? I am the current president and can tell
you that many of our members are dying to meet you in person. Approximately
500 people attend. We do not have the funds to pay you but could generously
cover all expenses and would arrange a two-night stay at the Hilton where the
meeting is held. Furthermore, we have a promise from a Fox News journalist to
attend. As you might expect, this journalist has written a number of pieces very
critical of some “postmodern thinking” and has stated that this theorising has
been doing damage to real social causes.
We can take the thought experiment further. Imagine one of the authors,
for reasons of reflexive ethnography, then attends and speaks, and publicity
results, including the Fox critique of some cultural studies. Offers of grant
money follow (it can happen without applying!) and editors of more
“prestigious” journals that are less critical theory oriented ask Lindsay
et al., or any author in the thought experiment, to submit papers. The authors
then become respected figures in the field as did happen to Lindsay et al. (i.e.,
review requests). Who knows, in this thought experiment, a Nobel Prize can
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follow. What would the authors or average academic do in this situation?
Come clean? Note that this is not a comment or challenge to the integrity and
honesty of the authors. It is not unlikely that these positive consequences
would change the mind of a theorist. Such an author may just come to realize
that their own original view of fat bodybuilding was actually in the minority.
Even if Lindsay et al. are to argue that their minds could never be changed
with respect to fat studies, this is not important. As stated, it is not relevant
what anyone privately thinks about their own work. Thus, if the authors
continued in their reflexive ethnography experiment all the way up to and
including their Nobel Prize–winning lecture, while still laughing to them-
selves, their work has passed the academic paper Turing test.
This is the basic conundrum and paradox of a “hoax” academic article that
is no different to a nonhoax article with the sole exception of the private
thoughts of the authors. The fact that Lindsay et al. fully intended to make
those private thoughts public is similarly irrelevant. In the thought experi-
ment, people would likely state that they don’t care what the original moti-
vation was, only that an important consequence (e.g., fat acceptance)
followed.
The Trypophobia “hoax”
Of course, Lindsay et al. would correctly argue that this actual series of
events could not occur with the fat bodybuilding idea. However, one can
assume that something similar to this thought experiment does occasionally
occur. Indeed, it happened to the present author. In 2013, myself and a
colleague published a paper in a high-ranking general psychology journal
in which we were the first to describe, in the peer-reviewed literature, the
bizarre phenomenon in which certain people feel uncomfortable and/or even
nauseous when looking at holes/circles clustered together (Cole and Wilkins
2013). As part of this work, myself and Wilkins examined the stimuli that
induce “trypophobia” with respect to their spectral composition. This math-
ematical analysis showed that the images have an extremely unique spectral
property that very rarely occurs in the natural environment, that is, high
contrast a midrange spatial frequencies. One class of stimuli that does pos-
sess this property is the aposematic patterns and coloring of many poisonous
animals. We therefore made the argument (“hand-waving”) that the human
brain, including the visual system, has been selected for its sensitivity toward
the spectral property possessed by noxious animals. The result of this is that
any stimulus that just happens by coincidence to possess this feature will be
averse to view. As a result of this work, the present author has been invited to
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speak at conferences and departmental seminars, obtained promotion, and
been interviewed on live radio numerous times, and the original paper has
initiated an abundance of follow-up work (but no Nobel Prize). I have also
received approximately 100 e-mails and letters from trypophobic individuals
wanting to share their experience. As with many seemingly bizarre condi-
tions, the typical comment is that the individual thought they were the only
person suffering from the condition.
Before the article formally appeared, it was put to me on a number of
occasions that trypophobia is not real and even ludicrous. Even now, a
Google search for “Is trypophobia real” suggests that it is not real. For
instance, the website Medical News Today state that “Some researchers
question the validity of trypophobia as a condition.” After presenting the
work at a meeting of the Experimental Psychology Society in the UK in 2013,
I was genuinely asked whether I had heard of the Sokal affair and whether the
trypophobia work was itself a hoax. Furthermore, a number of journalists,
including the first one to report the phenomenon (in the Washington Post)
following publication, wanted assurance from myself that it was not a hoax.
It could well have been and the large amount of skepticism that still sur-
rounds the phenomenon would very much have aided this perfectly. Even the
most frequently cited image that induces the phenomenon sounds part of the
hoax; the lotus seed pod is a flower, an object usually associated with a
pleasant emotion. Thus, trypophobia has all the hallmarks of a hoax. My
coauthor and I could now say, “OK, it’s clear from a simple Google search
that the game is up. It was all a hoax. We were perhaps too unsubtle when
we suggested that a popular selling flower could make people feel sick.”
We can also assume that there are many critical theory academics who
relish the thought of a paper being published, based on mathematical anal-
ysis from a “harder science,” turning out to be a hoax. This would of course
make the point that it is not just critical theory that is susceptible to ludi-
crous ideas.
As with the Baldwin article, the important point is that it is irrelevant
whether Wilkins and myself intended the work as a hoax. We simply
described a (somewhat bizarre) phenomenon and posited a theory as to why
it occurs. It is irrelevant what our intention or motivation was. It is tempting
to tease the reader and suggest it was indeed intended as a hoax. There is
however one fundamental reason why trypophobia cannot be a hoax, and it is
exactly the same reason why fat bodybuilding cannot be a hoax or at least
only a hoax in the minds of Lindsay et al. Whether one considers it ludicrous
or not, 15 percent of the adult population feel “uncomfortable or even
repulsed” at the site of holes clustered together. It simply cannot be ludicrous
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if 15 percent of the population say it is not. To put this another way, Wilkins
and myself would not get away with now claiming that trypophobia was a
hoax because enough people (at least 15 percent) would see through it. To
argue otherwise would lead to the odd situation in which we, the original
authors, were stating that it was all a hoax and yet others (correctly) stating
that it simply exists. This is the same situation faced by fat bodybuilding.
There are likely to be enough people who are of the opinion that fat body-
building is not actually “ludicrous.” We may not like the fact that some
notions are not considered ludicrous by large sections of society but so be
it. Many may not like the fact that up to 25 percent of the population do not
believe that man landed on the moon, but it’s a question of winning the
argument.
To reiterate the central contention, consider the hoax, or at least hoax-like,
write-up of a series of lectures given by the philosopher John McDowell in
1991. Unlike Cole and Wilkins (2013), this work includes no empirical data
that allow a firm judgment to be made on whether Mind and World (McDo-
well 1994) was indeed a hoax. The work is (I think) concerned with the
perceptual system of human and nonhuman animals, the research field of
the present author. Part of the reason to suspect it is a hoax is because too
much of it makes no sense. It is an unsubtle parody of philosophical theoriz-
ing and phrasing. For example, it is incredibly difficult to unpack what is
actually being stated; this is despite the fact that the issues addressed should
not be difficult to describe and follow.2 Furthermore, a lot of it reads like
Postmodern Generator. For instance, jumping from one idea (e.g., the human
visual system) to a totally unrelated idea buttressed with a famous theorist
(“consider the richness of a normal adult human being’s visual field, which is
far beyond anything that could matter for a capacity to cope with merely
animal needs. Marx says ‘according to the laws of beauty . . . ’,” p. 119).
There is also reference to somewhat bizarre resemblances. Thus, the differ-
ence between the experience of the “animal life” and the “human life” is said
to coincide “strikingly” with Marx’s notion of alienated labor. This may well
be true, but as Chomsky (2002) stated, one could compare a child with Bin
Laden. The suspicion of a hoax is further aided by a later revised edition in
which McDowell, perhaps sensing that it was going to be exposed, remarked,
“I have been made to realize that it is harder to understand than I thought”
and thus provided a new introductory chapter “omitting some detail in order
to focus on the central theme.” The new chapter is less clear than the original
text. However, again, whether McDowell, myself, or anyone consider it to be
a hoax (or not) is simply not important; it is irrelevant to the ideas put
forward. Indeed, aside from the many bizarre statements and extreme
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obfuscation, there are many interesting ideas, and as with Baldwin (2018)
and Cole and Wilkins (2013), these are ideas that can be judged irrespective
of any motivation.
The problematic issues of author motivation and intent have become
central to another hoax article, published within months of Sokal’s paper.
The field of evolutionary psychology has perhaps attracted more criticism for
its advocacy of what many consider ludicrous ideas than any other field (e.g.,
Buller 2005). This discipline attempts to determine which aspects of human
behavior have been shaped by Darwinian selection pressures. The central
claim of its opponents is that it relies too heavily on post hoc explanations of
behavior, rather than hypothesis testing. As Stephen Jay Gould famously
said, these explanations are little more than “just so” story telling. In this
context, Ramachandran (1997) published an article in which he argued that
the reason males are particularly attracted to blonde females, as opposed to
for instance brunettes, is that infestation with intestinal parasites is easier to
detect on the former. This would have resulted in a selection pressure for
blonde attraction. He then revealed that it had been a hoax, or in his own
words “spoof.” Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998) added that “if you think
my theory is silly, then you should read some of the others” (p. 291). An odd
situation then arose, the same one that would have arisen had I claimed that
trypophobia was a hoax; others questioned its status as a hoax (e.g., Symons
2000). Even Ramachandran (1997) wrote that “this idea is at least as viable
as many other theories.” Was it a hoax or not? It does seem to be intended
that way, but to reiterate, it simply doesn’t matter what the author or any of us
think. An idea was presented that is the subject of critical analysis and in this
case can be empirically examined.
One important aspect of the Ramachandran hoax is how the article has
influenced lay public thinking. In May 2014, the SnowBrains Internet mag-
azine provided a summary of the original paper. That is, the actual article, not
the hoax aspect. Furthermore, one hundred and seventy-eight people have
now (January 2020) commented on the piece in a “comments” section.
Nowhere, in the article or comments, is there any reference to the Rama-
chandran paper being a hoax. Indeed, the vast majority of posts are positive,
for example, “this explains a lot.” This is one of the serious problems with
hoax science. Many thousands of people (the magazine’s Facebook site has
64,000 followers) now believe in an idea that most evolutionary theorists
would consider ludicrous. This is precisely because Ramachandran’s article
quacked like an evolutionary psychology paper; thus, it was an evolutionary
psychology paper.
12 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
Let the People Decide
Unlike many areas of academia in which experts are in a good position to
judge claims (e.g., evolutionary psychology), the idea that fat bodybuilding
should be an endeavor is an opinion. The problem with judging another’s
opinion is clear. One of the central charges made against people who describe
themselves as being of a left-wing persuasion is that they too often assume
others are too ill informed, uneducated, and ignorant to make judgments on
important issues concerning culture and society. The idea that the general
population cannot adequately judge whether an idea coming from progres-
sive academics, such as fat bodybuilding, is an expression of this. The
extreme version of this notion came from Breitbart news founder, the late
Andrew Breitbart. He stated on numerous occasions that he had identified the
central problem with American society (e.g., Breitbart 2011). He argued that
the Marxist philosophers of the Frankfurt school of thought, who moved to
the United States in the 1930s, had shaped the minds of young people with
their ideology of critical theory (“How did it trick so many millions of
people?”). Although propaganda is by definition very effective, and it is
certainly true that this school has had access to many thousands of minds,
it would require sci-fi levels of thought control to assume that a handful of
academics can have had this much influence. The fact that postmodern ideas
have become so prevalent outside of the university campus can only be
because people broadly accept them, unless we assume that people are too
dumb to consider what is best for themselves. The same has to be true on the
other side of the political divide. One may not like the free market economics
espoused by Hayek and the Chicago School of Economics, but again one
must assume that the people, perhaps for reasons of personal freedom, have
broadly accepted this view. Thus, while Lindsay et al. are correct when they
state that professors “cite and teach” these ideas which are “spreading rapidly
into culture,” one must presume that the population is not in some kind of
false consciousness. One can argue that ideas should be put out there and the
people can decide. Recall that we are dealing with philosophy here not
empirical science.
The fat bodybuilding hoax paper is as much a reflection of Lindsay et al.’s
ideology as it is critical theory’s. This is also evident in their other hoax
articles. For example, one paper argued that if a man privately fantasizes
about a women in a sexual way, without her consent, he commits
“metasexual” violence against. Lindsay et al. state that their purpose was
to see “if the definition of sexual violence can be expanded into thought
crimes.” Many have become increasingly concerned at the number of times a
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person is accused of a thought crime. The problem however is that these
people, including Lindsay et al. and myself, are in the minority. Although
there are no empirical data on the subject, society does like to punish people
for thought crimes. In October 2018, the Manchester United football man-
ager, Jose Mourinho, was seen mouthing some words after a match close to a
television camera. The sport’s governing body, the Football Association,
employed a lip reader to determine what he had said, then charged him with
using abusive language. Of all the social media discussion that ensued, I
cannot find one reference to Mourinho effectively being charged with a
thought crime. It would be no different had the Football Association (FA)
requested he take part in a brain imaging session to uncover what he thinks
about certain officials at the FA. In fact, this would not have been as bad
since it would need his consent, unlike the lip reading. Similarly, when the
ex–football professional David Beckham was the victim of a crime which
resulted in the public discovering a thought he had (he was cross at not being
awarded a knighthood), he was vilified for this thought. Again, I cannot find
one reference to him being effectively convicted of a thought crime. It’s
worth noting that we can also apply methodological behaviorisms here;
irrespective of what people explicitly state, society acts as if thought crimes
should be punished. The notion of such a crime may be ludicrous to both
myself and Lindsay et al., but this is only our opinion; it’s our ideology. It
appears not to be unreasonable to society as may well be the case with fat
bodybuilding. If an academic has a problem with thought crimes, it would be
far better to make the argument via the publication of a “real” paper in which
the author points out that society is sleepwalking into a situation where
thought crimes are becoming normalized.
Although the idea that something is ludicrous is subjective, it’s worth
noting that it can be examined in an empirical manner. Lindsay et al. did
state that the Baldwin article “should not be mistaken for the real thing.” As
previously, I see no difference between it and the real thing, just like the
readers of SnowBrains did not with respect to the Ramachandran article, and
it’s likely that I would have not done so if I had not known about the authors’
intentions. Empirically, we simply get a sample of people to indicate whether
fat bodybuilding is ludicrous or not. Furthermore, although one may be
forgiven for thinking that this experiment is best carried out on the nonstu-
dent population (i.e., those not so exposed to critical theory), this is only the
case if we consider the student population not clever enough to judge fat
bodybuilding. I suspect that enough people will respond such that it is
deemed not ridiculous. I am however guessing. It partly depends on how
many people hold libertarian values. As the evolutionary biologist Haldane
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famously quipped, scientific ideas go through a number of phases from “this
is nonsense” to “I always said so.” If 1 in 20 U.S. citizens believe that the
U.S. government “actively planned” 911 (Zogby International Poll 2007),
then all bets are off with respect to what is ludicrousness. If the human
condition is to hold ludicrous views, then so be it.
The Reflexive Ethnography Paradigm
One feature of any academic discipline is that a person immersed within a
field will occasionally write about some of the practices the discipline
employs. The most notable of what may be termed classical reflexive ethno-
graphy concerned the protection of human participants in experimental psy-
chology. Perhaps motivated by Milgram’s (1963) Obedience to Authority
experiment and the Stanford Prison experiment (e.g., Haney, Banks, and
Zimbardo 1973), psychologists decided to require peers to evaluate each
other’s experimental designs to ensure that participants will not be coerced,
embarrassed, or placed in danger. (One can add that many current ethics
applications have broadened “participation” to include any person involved
in the work including the researchers themselves, this may come to include
editors.) In more recent years, the most significant change to have occurred
as a direct result of classical reflexive ethnography is the way in which
researchers employ statistical testing. Central to this is the notion that anal-
yses relying solely on a “p value” to determine significance is inadequate. Put
simply, if a phenomenon is true (i.e., the null hypothesis can be rejected), the
probability of observing the effect is largely down to how many data points
(e.g., participants) one has. In other words, how hard the experimenter works.
The size of the effect observed has thus become as important, if not more so,
as the p value. These are two clear examples of how successful reflexive
practice can be.
In the Methods section of the Lindsay et al. (2018) explanation of the
grievance studies hoax, the authors refer to their approach as “a kind of
reflexive ethnography” in which they immersed themselves within the crit-
ical theory discipline in order to critically evaluate it. In the present section, I
present what I feel are the central problems with reflexive ethnography in the
form that Lindsay et al. advocate.
The most fundamental limitation of the Baldwin article, and the others in
the grievance studies series, is the absence of a control condition (i.e., a
noncritical theory paper). Such a condition would have tested whether there
is another factor generating the effects Lindsay et al. observed. This is a basic
principle of experimental science. A common critique or comment on the
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Sokal affair, and the Lindsay et al. work, is that it says more about the
limitations of the peer-review system than it does about cultural studies. A
control condition would have allowed an assessment of whether critical
theory is particularly prone to espousing ludicrous nonsense. One does how-
ever have to note that in some sense, a control condition would not have been
needed to determine whether ludicrous ideas get through the peer-review
system. This happens all the time. Indeed, I would predict that a larger
proportion of academics judge at least one theory in their discipline to be
“ludicrous” than the lay public would judge fat bodybuilding to be.
If the Lindsay et al. work is not solely an effect of the peer-review system,
peer-review limitations certainly helped the reflexive ethnography method.
Although not always stated, trust is a major aspect of peer review. Academics
will often receive a personal request from an editor in which he or she
acknowledges that the paper is not quite in the academic’s area of expertise
but he or she is having trouble finding reviewers, especially for a method and
findings that are particularly novel. The reviewer has to trust that they will
not deliberately be made to feel a fool by reviewing a paper they will not be
confident with. Thus, in the Methods section of one of the reflexive ethno-
graphy articles, Lindsay et al. stated “this study is best considered mostly
qualitative in nature and did not make use of rigorous statistical analysis.” A
reviewer is likely to trust such a statement, particularly one not confident
with statistics, and so not comment on the analysis in their review. When
later describing the reflexive ethnography method, Lindsay et al. (2018)
stated that this very paper included “incredibly implausible statistics.” It is
not therefore surprising that the reflexive ethnography paradigm is going to
be successful if it persuades reviewers to be lenient on one aspect of a
manuscript, which is then used as an example of how poor the paper is.
Another central problem with the form of reflexive ethnography advo-
cated by Lindsay et al. is the difficulty of evaluating the merits of the
reflexive ethnography itself. This is because the reader cannot know what
parts of a manuscript are “real” and what parts are intended as the hoax. Of
course, the point is to make manuscripts as ludicrous as possible without
“being caught,” but any method still has to be evaluated. For instance, when a
reflexive ethnography paper is particularly poor, is this because it is intended
that way or is the real reflexive ethnography itself just poor? This has
actually arisen with the Lindsay et al. work. One of the hoax papers includes
the classic undergraduate error of using the word “data” as singular rather
than plural, that is, incorrectly using “This data” or “The data was.” When
reading the paper, the present author genuinely assumed that this was part of
the hoax, that is, poorly written grammar that includes a classic error never
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seen in journal articles. However, in one of the follow-up “real” articles in
which Lindsay and Pluckrose (2019) described and defended their project,
the authors continued this error. Thus, this Lindsay and Pluckrose article
satisfies their own definition of a hoax paper, that is, “visibly amateurish
construction.” To be clear, this is not a comment on fellow authors’ writing
ability (we could all do this); it’s about knowing which parts of an article are
the intended hoax. In the extreme, the methods and writing of a paper may be
so bad precisely because the authors are such incompetent reflexive ethno-
graphers as opposed to great hoaxers.
Perhaps the most cited issue for reflexive ethnography is its advocacy of
data fabrication. It’s difficult to think of any situation in which it is appro-
priate to include such data in an article. No empirical scientist would advo-
cate a paradigm in which the data are fabricated, even if the intention is that
authors eventually reveal this. Data are sacrosanct because they reveal how
the world works; they cannot be disputed (as long as all agree on the appro-
priateness of the method). Furthermore, other researchers could even attempt
to replicate the original data, including, for example, an “anti-critical theory”
experimenter who was skeptical of the original claims and the data. At risk of
dancing on a pinhead, the silliness of, for instance, examining dog genitals
(in the context of critical theory, see their Dog Park hoax paper) is the very
idea, not the actual data themselves. Data are data; how the world actually
works. If a researcher wants to undertake reflexive ethnography, in order to
evaluate the basic merits of a field, then this should not include the fabrica-
tion of data. Thus, the data collection should have been part of the Lindsay
et al. hoax. One can fairly assume that if the data presented in the Dog Park
paper were somehow easily and quickly generated (which of course those
were not), then they would have been included; the reason that Lindsay et al.
did not include real data is the same reason why any academics fabricate
data—to save themselves the bother of collecting them. Moreover, there is an
unwritten rule when peer-reviewing empirical work. As the amount of data
increases, the threshold for acceptance decreases. This is because no matter
how unlikely or ludicrous an interpretation of data is, the data are always
there for others to reinterpret; something has been uncovered about the world
that was not known before. While this may not be the case in the Dog Park
paper, it could be the case for future reflexive ethnography papers.
The importance of method and data honesty can be seen in perhaps the
most notable case of possible data fraud. Gregor Mendel is well known
because of his discovery of the principles by which genetic inheritance
occurs. Following the claim of the British geneticist and statistician R. A.
Fisher in 1936, it has often been asserted that Mendel fabricated his data.
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This is based on the observation that his reported approximation to the
critical three-fourth ratios in the “F2” generation were far too close to what
should be actually observed (but see Hartl and Fairbanks 2007; Novitski
2004, for counter claims). One might be forgiven for thinking that this is a
“justifiable” case of data fabrication. Mendel was simply reaffirming what he
had discovered and what he knew to be the truth, a truth, now well estab-
lished, that pertains to one of the most important findings in the history of
biology. However, this has clearly not excused the (possible) fabrication, and
his scientific integrity remains challenged by some. The point with respect to
the grievance studies project is this: If one of the most important figures in
the history of biology cannot be excused from data fabrication, when pre-
senting one of the most important findings in science, then Lindsay et al.
cannot be excused when they wanted to highlight/expose some of the ideas in
critical theory. We could all fabricate data in order to persuade others of a
particular position.
In sum, the lack of a control condition, not being able to evaluate the
quality of a paper, and its advocacy of data fabrication make reflexive eth-
nography as a method of assessing the merits of a field too problematic to
serve as an adequate tool of investigation.
Conclusions
What we are left with is this: (1) a “hoax” that is only so in the minds of
Lindsay et al. and anyone else who wants it to be and (2) an idea whose merit
is solely based on opinion—an opinion that is not likely to reach the thresh-
old of what many people would consider as being outlandish and/or ludi-
crous. “Hoax” is therefore a meaningless concept when we are dealing with
nonempirical science. Indeed, perhaps the present article is a hoax or maybe
the Lindsay et al. explanation articles are part of a different hoax, including
the grammatical mistakes, aimed at exposing the idea that anti-critical theory
journalists and academics are so gullible and receptive to criticism of that
field they will even criticize attempts to eradicate the constant judgment of
the fat body. Furthermore, the authors argument that fat activism is not about
real social justice is also an opinion; it is an expression of the “Donkey
charity principle”—that donating to such a charity is not as worthy as, for
instance, donating to breast cancer charities. The point is not to argue for
animal–human equivalence, only that it’s OK to support one cause, even
when we know there are more deserving causes out there. We simply cannot
donate to every charity just as we can’t only support the most pressing social
injustices.
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With respect to the Baldwin article, it is fortunate that although retracted,
it is still available and can therefore be critically analyzed; society, perhaps
not clever enough to judge its merits, does not need to be protected from
anything it advocates. Fat Studies currently state: “Following an investiga-
tion across Taylor & Francis journals, we have confirmed this is a hoax
paper, which was submitted under false pretenses. As such we are retracting
it from the scholarly record.” The present author recommends that this
retraction should be retracted, as it were. I suggest the following replaces
the current text, “It has now come to light that the authors of this article do
not believe in some of the ideas they wrote.” This is a factual description of
the paper and, critically, is the central problem with the “hoax.” It does not
matter what an author believes but only what they write or propose. It is these
ideas that should be, and can only be, the subject of critical analysis.
Finally, if a fat person, tired of being constantly judged “morally, aesthe-
tically, physically, emotionally, economically, and in other ways that under-
mine their dignity” (Baldwin 2018:1), wants to support radical fat activism
and fat bodybuilding, then so be it. As Baldwin correctly pointed out, for
those opposed to this “Who are they to judge?”
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Notes
1. This is not to say that intent should never be considered in daily life. For example,
it is a cornerstone of the legal/justice system. A person may not have intended to
take another person’s life but did so through negligence.
2. See the page or so following the phrase “It is supposed to show something like
this” on page 112. I defy any perception scientist to understand what is being
stated.
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